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COMPENSATORY  DAMAGES  ARE  NOT  FOR
EVERYONE:  SECTION  1997E(E)  OF  THE
PRISON  LITIGATION  REFORM  ACT  AND
THE  OVERLOOKED  AMENDMENT
Eleanor M. Levine*
INTRODUCTION
Before the Senate in 1995, Senator Bob Dole described the impetus for
creating the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)1 as a reaction to: “the liti-
gation explosion now plaguing our country, [which] does not stop at
the prison gate . . . . [The PLRA] will help put an end to the inmate liti-
gation fun-and-games.”2  Congress enacted the PLRA in response to a
perceived explosion in litigation brought by prisoners against prison offici-
als.3  The Act was ostensibly designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits while pre-
serving meritorious suits.4  What Congress failed to recognize, however,
was that the increasing amount of litigation reflected a parallel rise
in the prison population.5  Ultimately, the PLRA has not substantively re-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Master of Social Work,
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015; B.A. in Art History, Williams College, 2011.  I
would like to thank Professor Richard Garnett for his guidance on this Note and my family
and friends for their love and support.  I am also incredibly grateful for the help of the
Notre Dame Law Review staff.
1 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)).
2 141 CONG. REC. S14,573, S14,626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
3 See Allison Cohn, Comment, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of Nominal and
Punitive Damages on the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 299, 303–04 (2006).
4 See Marissa C.M. Doran, Note, Lawsuits as Information: Prisons, Courts, and a Troika
Model of Petition Harms, 122 YALE L.J. 1024, 1040 (2013).
5 Id. at 1041; see also Jennifer Winslow, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical
Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant to?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1663
(2002) (“[T]he number of lawsuits filed by federal and state prisoners has dramatically
increased.  But this argument is incomplete, because the sheer growth of lawsuits filed fails
to take into account the corresponding increase in the size of the U.S. prison
population.”).
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duced the rate of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners against prison offici-
als.6
The PLRA, enacted in 1996, introduced a number of provisions that
seek to limit prisoners’ ability to bring frivolous lawsuits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides a civil action for deprivation of rights.7  These provi-
sions consist of, among other things, a requirement that prisoners exhaust
administrative remedies within the prison system before filing suit in court,8
a requirement that indigent prisoners pay all of their filing fees,9 a restriction
on attorneys’ fees,10 and a provision that prohibits prisoners from using in
forma pauperis provisions if the courts have already dismissed at least three of
their complaints for failure to state a claim.11
While the members of the Senate spent some time debating the other
provisions of the PLRA, they hardly discussed another provision: 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e).12  In 1996, this provision stated: “No Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury.”13  Since the PLRA was enacted, federal courts
have split over the question whether § 1997e(e) allows prisoners to recover
compensatory damages for claims in which their constitutional rights have
been violated but they have not suffered a physical injury.14
In 2013, the PLRA was amended (hereinafter “2013 Amendment”) as
part of the Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act15 to read:
6 See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 162 (2015).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.”).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)–(b) (2012).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  This provision does contain an exception for a situation in
which the prisoner is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id.
12 See Hilary Detmold, Note, ‘Tis Enough, ‘Twill Serve: Defining Physical Injury Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1111, 1116–17 (2013) (“The PLRA even-
tually passed with very little legislative debate, and with no mention whatsoever of the limi-
tation-on-recovery provision requiring prisoner-plaintiffs to show physical injury.”); see also
John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 429, 437 n.23 (2001) (describing the legislative history of the PLRA).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
14 See Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
15 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 1101(a), 127
Stat. 54, 134.
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No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of
a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title 18.16
This amendment followed a growing congressional awareness of and focus
on reducing rape in prisons,17 as well as vocal criticism of the PLRA after
some courts had interpreted § 1997e(e) to bar rape claims when the prisoner
could not prove a physical injury.18
Since the 2013 Amendment was passed, courts have continued to split
regarding how to interpret § 1997e(e), but they have failed to consider
whether the 2013 Amendment alters the meaning or clarifies Congress’s
intentions with respect to § 1997e(e).19  Part I of this Note gives the histori-
cal and legislative background of prison litigation and the enactment of the
PLRA.  Part II describes the circuit split surrounding the meaning of
§ 1997e(e).  Part III provides the background on sexual abuse in prisons, the
increased legislative concern about the issue, and the 2013 Amendment to
§ 1997e(e).  In Part IV, this Note argues that the 2013 Amendment changes
the plain meaning of § 1997e(e) such that it could lead to different out-
comes in cases on both sides of the circuit split, ultimately concluding that it
shows Congress intended the more restrictive interpretive approach to pre-
vail.  This Note further illustrates how the 2013 Amendment fails to adhere
to the goals of either the Prison Litigation Reform Act or the Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA), for which it was designed.  Part V argues that the
Supreme Court should clarify whether § 1997e(e) precludes prisoners from
seeking compensatory damages for constitutional violations absent physical
injury.  Ultimately, this Note recommends that a less restrictive interpretation
of § 1997e(e) would best achieve the goals of the PLRA and the PREA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Prison Litigation
Before the 1960s, the federal courts used a “hands-off” approach with
respect to state prisoner litigation.20  In fact, “[u]ntil the 1960s, it was unclear
whether prisoners retained any constitutional rights upon incarceration.”21
However, in the decades following the 1960s, the Supreme Court began pro-
16 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2013) (emphasis added).
17 See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION
COMMISSION REPORT (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf.
18 See James E. Robertson, The Prison Litigation Reform Act as Sex Litigation: (Imagining) a
Punk’s Perspective of the Act, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 276, 280 (2012).
19 See infra Parts II and IV.
20 See Alison Brill, Note, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility After
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 652 (2008); Doran, supra note 4, at
1036–39.
21 Cohn, supra note 3, at 302 (“Federal courts adopted a ‘hands off’ policy with regard
to prisoner civil rights lawsuits and consistently deferred to the authority of prison
administrators.”).
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viding expanded constitutional protections for prisoners, allowing them to
bring claims for infringement of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.22  Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized a prohibition on
excessive force, access to sufficient healthcare, religious freedom, access to
prison libraries, and due process rights for prisoners.23  Furthermore, the
Court clarified that state facilities had a duty to protect people in their care,
premised on the notion that if a prison restrains a person’s freedom so much
that “it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needs . . . it transgresses the substantive limits on
state action set by [the Constitution].”24  However, the Court has also
retained significant protections for prisons by deferring to administration
decisionmaking, using a standard that permits prison regulation of prisoners’
constitutional rights when the regulation is “ ‘reasonably related’ to legiti-
mate penological interests”25 and allows challenges to prison regulation only
when the policy is so unrelated to a government initiative that it is “so remote
as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”26  Additionally, any public offi-
cial is entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages “unless a rea-
sonable official in his position would know that his specific conduct violated
clearly established rights.”27
Since the Supreme Court began recognizing constitutional claims from
prisoners using § 1983 in the 1960s, prisoners and advocacy groups have used
litigation to expose problems within prisons and spur reform.28  Throughout
22 See Cooper v. Pate, in which the Supreme Court permitted a prisoner to bring a
claim for infringement of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he was
prohibited from buying religious publications and privileges allowed for other prisoners.
378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).  However, § 1983 does not provide substantive rights in and of
itself; rather, it is a mechanism through which prisoners can assert rights under federal law.
See Cohn, supra note 3, at 301–02; see also Stephen W. Miller, Note, Rethinking Prisoner
Litigation: Shifting from Qualified Immunity to a Good Faith Defense in § 1983 Prisoner Lawsuits,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 929, 933 (2009) (“The general purposes underlying § 1983 litiga-
tion are deterring officials from using their positions to deprive individuals of their rights
protected by the Constitution or federal statutes, and providing victims of such depriva-
tions with a remedy in federal court.”).  To assert a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show
deprivation of some right under federal law and that it occurred “under color of law.”
“Under color of law” means that the defendant either had the power or the apparent
power of the state behind him. Id. at 934.
23 See Detmold, supra note 12, at 1123–24; Doran, supra note 4, at 1036–39.
24 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
25 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1986) (“Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration.”).
26 Id. at 89–90.
27 Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F. Supp. 2d 520, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also Miller, supra note 22, at 937–39 (describing
qualified immunity for government officials).
28 See Doran, supra note 4, at 1036–39; see also Brill, supra note 20, at 652 n.37 (“Prison-
ers may also access federal courts through other statutory means, including: (i) Section
1985 suits, a conspiracy corollary to § 1983 suits; and (ii) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 5 15-JUN-17 12:08
2017] compensatory  damages  are  not  for  everyone 2207
this time, the courts, rather than Congress, largely drove prison reform.29  In
fact, litigation proved to be a valuable tool for prisoners to provide informa-
tion to the outside world regarding wrongdoing within their prisons.30
Going to court has proven to be a particularly effective method of communi-
cation because prisoners do not have access to other channels of reform,
such as the political process.31  As Margo Schlanger and Giovanna Shay have
written:
[F]or prisons—closed institutions holding an ever-growing disempowered
population—most of the methods by which we, as a polity, foster govern-
ment accountability and equality among citizens are unavailable or at least
not currently practiced.  In the absence of other levers by which these ordi-
nary norms can be encouraged, lawsuits, which bring judicial scrutiny
behind bars, and which promote or even compel constitutional compliance,
accordingly take on an outsize importance.32
Likewise, litigation can result in more than just a win for an individual plain-
tiff; it can lead to broader positive change within prisons if a prisoner’s law-
suit triggers a judge to mandate reforms within the penal system.33  Not only
can court orders lead to changes in prison policies and practices, litigation
can also lead to increased public awareness and scrutiny of issues in prisons,
putting pressure on officials to more effectively implement change.34  Fur-
thermore, litigation can lead to increases in funding that might be needed by
a prison.35  Ultimately, litigation may prove more effective for protecting
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which prohibits discrimination of otherwise qualified handi-
capped individuals.  The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also provides a means for
prisoners to sue.” (citation omitted)); Elizabeth A. Etchells, Note, Please Pass the Dictionary:
Defining De Minimis Physical Injury Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act § 1997e(e), 100 IOWA
L. REV. 803, 811 (2015) (“[O]rganizations like the American Civil Liberties Union . . .
started litigating on behalf of prisoners.  This allowed the sometimes brutal conditions
inside American prisons to be exposed, and even conservative-leaning jurists . . . acknowl-
edged the necessary role of the federal judiciary in correcting these wrongs.” (footnote
omitted)).
29 See Brill, supra note 20, at 646.
30 See generally Doran, supra note 4.
31 Etchells, supra note 28, at 808–09 (“[A]s individual wardens and correctional
officers control the enforcement of prisoner rights, lawsuits are uniquely well positioned to
challenge improper actions . . . .”).
32 Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139,
139–40 (2008) (footnote omitted).
33 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 17, at 10, 91 (“Courts cannot
replace internal monitoring, audits, and ombudsmen or inspectors general, yet society
depends on them when other modes of oversight fail or are lacking altogether.”).
34 Id. at 91.
35 Id. (quoting the former Warden of San Quentin State Prison and former head of
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as saying: “All of this court
intervention has been necessary because of my state’s unwillingness to provide the Depart-
ment with the resources it requires.  These lawsuits have helped the state make dramatic
improvements to its deeply flawed prison system”).
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prisoners’ rights than political change, as the debates surrounding the imple-
mentation of the PLRA have shown, because politicians may focus more on
appearing tough on crime and reducing the cost of prisons than on prisoner
rights.36
Nevertheless, while prisoner litigation can lead to positive reform in pris-
ons, it can also lead to problems within the legal system.  On the one hand,
some argue that increasing funding for prisoners as a result of litigation con-
tributes to the growth of mass incarceration and the prison bureaucracy in
the United States.37  On the other hand, some view court orders mandating
prison reform as forms of activism by liberal judges intervening erroneously
in state domains.38  Inarguably, starting in the 1960s, the number of prisoner
lawsuits increased significantly.39  While this increase corresponded with
growth in the prison population, it nevertheless created a burden on the
courts.40  In 1994, prisoners filed 39,065 lawsuits, up from 6606 in 1975.41  In
1993, prisoner suits made up over one third of all civil appeals that were
filed.42  Furthermore, only a small proportion of those lawsuits were deemed
meritorious enough to go to trial.43  As Senator Orrin Hatch told the Senate
in September 1995, “[t]he crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it
difficult for the courts to consider meritorious claims.”44  Of course, the poor
rates of success by prisoner litigants could be explained by a shortage of law-
yers willing to represent them, low income, high rates of disability both physi-
cally and psychologically, and bias on behalf of the courts against prisoners
filing lawsuits against their prisons.45
36 141 CONG. REC. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Many
people think of prison inmates as spending their free time in the weight room or the
television lounge.  But the most crowded place in today’s prisons may be the law library. . . .
Today’s system seems to encourage prisoners to file with impunity.  After all, it’s free.”); see
also Detmold, supra note 12, at 1116–17 (describing the legislative process for enacting the
PLRA).
37 Schlanger, supra note 6, at 171.
38 See Boston, supra note 12, at 437 n.23.
39 Schlanger, supra note 6, at 156 (“A steep increase in prisoner civil rights litigation
combined in the 1970s with a steep increase in incarcerated population.  The filing rate
slowly declined in the 1980s but the increase in jail and prison population nonetheless
pushed up raw filings.  Then, as in the 1970s, the 1990s saw an increase in both jail and
prison population and filings rates, until 1995.”).
40 See Etchells, supra note 28, at 806.
41 Walter Berns, Sue the Warden, Sue the Chef, Sue the Gardener, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24,
1995), https://www.aei.org/publication/sue-the-warden-sue-the-chef-sue-the-gardener/.
42 Cohn, supra note 3, at 303–04.
43 See 141 CONG. REC. S14,626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(“[R]oughly 94.7 percent [of lawsuits brought by prisoners in federal court] are dismissed
before the pretrial phase, and only a scant 3.1 percent have enough validity to even reach
trial.”).
44 Id. at S14,627.
45 See Doran, supra note 4, at 1043.
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B. Understanding the PLRA
The PLRA was enacted in response to Congress’s concerns regarding the
increasing rate of prisoner litigation in the 1990s.46  Members of Congress
had become particularly nervous about the rate of frivolous claims tying up
the courts as well as the overall cost of litigation on the government and
taxpayers.47  As a result, Congress’s debates about the PLRA centered around
the importance of reducing frivolous lawsuits while not preventing meritori-
ous ones.48  However, given that the PLRA led to dramatic consequences for
many individuals, Congress spent little time debating its potential weak-
nesses.49  Section 1997e(e) in particular was not discussed in any legislative
reports or in the floor debates.50  While there was some pushback against the
Act,51 the PLRA ultimately passed easily as part of an appropriations bill.52
The PLRA contains a number of provisions designed to address what
Congress perceived as high numbers of frivolous lawsuits.  Some of the most
well-known and contested provisions include a requirement that prisoners
exhaust administrative remedies within their prisons before filing suit in fed-
eral court, capping attorneys’ fees at 150% of damages when suits are success-
ful, requiring indigent prisoners to pay initial filing fees, and limiting filing
in forma pauperis after a prisoner’s claims have been dismissed three times so
that prisoners must pay over one hundred dollars when they file their claim
46 See Schlanger, supra note 6, at 156.
47 141 CONG. REC. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“The vast
majority of frivolous suits are brought in Federal courts . . . . Federal prisoners are churn-
ing out lawsuits with no regard to this cost to the taxpayers or their legal merit.  We can no
longer ignore this abuse of our court system and taxpayers’ funds.”).  Examples of frivolous
lawsuits presented to Congress included a complaint by a prisoner who was served creamy
instead of chunky peanut butter, another who complained about being given jeans that fit
badly, and a third who bragged on television about filing hundreds of lawsuits. Id. at
S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Reid).
48 See id. at S14,626–27; see also Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(“[M]embers of Congress also made it clear that the PLRA was not meant to bar serious,
potentially meritorious claims.”).
49 Boston, supra note 12, at 437 n.23.
50 Id.
51 Then-Senator Joseph Biden brought up stories about meritorious prisoner litigation
where the courts had created positive remedies.  141 CONG. REC. S14,628 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“Stemming the tide of frivolous lawsuits is certainly
an important goal. . . . But in solving these problems, we must not lose sight of the fact that
some of these lawsuits have merit—some prisoners’ rights are violated—some prisons are
terribly overcrowded.”); see also Etchells, supra note 28, at 813 (describing the one-sided-
ness of the debates in Congress).
52 See Winslow, supra note 5, at 1660, 1662 (“In a process that some lawmakers consid-
ered ‘inappropriate’ for a bill making substantive changes to the federal rights of prison-
ers, the PLRA breezed through the Senate and easily passed without ever being subjected
to a committee mark-up and with few voices raised in opposition.” (footnotes omitted)
(citing 142 CONG. REC. S2296 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“In
reality, the PLRA is a far-reaching effort to strip Federal courts of the authority to remedy
unconstitutional prison conditions.”))).
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regardless of their financial capabilities.53  The PLRA applies to all civil suits
regarding a prisoner’s incarceration.54  However, after a prisoner has filed a
lawsuit in federal court, prison officials can move to dismiss the claim for
failure to comply with any of the other provisions in the PLRA.  For example,
if the prisoner has filed pro se but unknowingly did not fully comply with
prison administration remedies first, the court must dismiss his claim.55  Fur-
thermore, if a prisoner has mistakenly failed to exhaust the remedies within
his prison, perhaps because he is filing pro se and does not fully understand
the procedures, and the court then dismisses his claim, that dismissal counts
as one strike under the in forma pauperis provision.56
Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA57 has caused considerable problems in
the courts due to lack of clarity.  As John Boston wrote: “The PLRA’s mental
or emotional injury provision may well present the highest concentration of
poor drafting in the smallest number of words in the entire United States
Code.”58  Section 1997e(e) has proven problematic because it does not
define “physical injury” or “mental or emotional injury,” nor does it specify
whether harms other than mental and emotional injuries, unaccompanied by
physical injury, qualify for compensatory damages.59  Congress’s reasoning
for prohibiting mental and emotional injuries presumably stems from tort
law, which disallows recovery for these types of injuries because of the notion
that they can be easily faked or overblown in the absence of a physical
53 See Aref, 833 F.3d at 265–66.  For an analysis of how each of these provisions nega-
tively affects prisoners and bars indigent prisoners from bringing lawsuits regardless of
merit, see Boston, supra note 12, at 430–33 (“[The limit on filing in forma pauperis] is more
than a nuisance or even a hardship.  It is an absolute barrier to a litigant who does not have
the money for filing fees—and many do not.  This class of absolutely indigent prisoners is
composed disproportionately of the most oppressed people in the prison system, those
held in administrative and disciplinary segregation units, frequently the locus of the worst
abuses and harshest conditions in the prison system.  These prisoners are generally barred
from prison jobs and have no means of earning money.  Under the PLRA, their indigency
will bar many of them from any ability to seek judicial redress.” (footnotes omitted)).  This
Note focuses primarily on § 1997e(e).
54 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 17, at 93.
55 Id. (“Any mistakes, such as using an incorrect form, may forever bar an incarcerated
individual from real access to the courts.”).
56 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015)
(upholding a literal reading of the three-strikes provision by not allowing a prisoner who
was appealing his third dismissed claim from bringing a new claim in forma pauperis in the
meantime); Maureen Brocco, Facing the Facts: The Guarantee Against Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment in Light of PLRA, Iqbal, and PREA, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 917, 942–43 (2013)
(“After three strikes—even if the strikes resulted from errors related to the inmate’s pro se
status—the impoverished prisoner must pay off all of the previous filing fees before the
court can hear his or her complaint.”).
57 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2013) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a
sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).”).
58 Boston, supra note 12, at 434.
59 See Detmold, supra note 12, at 1111.
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injury.60  However, tort law does differentiate between emotional injuries
and intangible injuries.61  As a result, circuits have split over whether consti-
tutional violations absent physical injury fall within § 1997e(e)’s purview as
intangible injuries.62  Ultimately, though, most courts agree that § 1997e(e)
applies to a prisoner’s ability to recover compensatory damages, not punitive
damages, nominal damages, or injunctive relief.63
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The federal circuits have divided over the meaning of § 1997e(e) with
respect to whether prisoners can sue for damages for constitutional violations
absent a physical injury.  In particular, the courts have divided in cases involv-
ing the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.64  Approxi-
mately half of the circuits, including the Second, Third, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, interpret § 1997e(e) more restrictively (hereinafter the
“more restrictive approach”), to preclude compensatory damages if the claim
simply does not involve a physical injury.65  This interpretation applies to “all
federal civil actions including claims alleging constitutional violations.”66
These circuits focus on the type of injury alleged by the prisoner,67 essentially
dividing all injuries into either physical or nonphysical harms.68  These cir-
cuits read the plain language of the provision and “refus[e] to permit altera-
60 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 280.
61 See Doran, supra note 4, at 1047–48.
62 See infra Part II.
63 See Cohn, supra note 3, at 308–09.  In fact, courts have upheld the constitutionality
of the PLRA by pointing to the alternative forms of relief still available to prisoners
through nominal and punitive damages awards.  See Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 262 n.15
(D.C. Cir. 2016).  Courts have not uniformly agreed on this issue, though.  For example, in
Davis v. District of Columbia, the court held that “much if not all of Congress’s evident intent
would be thwarted if prisoners could surmount § 1997e(e) simply by adding a claim for
punitive damages and an assertion that the defendant acted maliciously.”  158 F.3d 1342,
1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Congress
did not intend section 1997e(e) to bar recovery for all forms of relief.”).
64 Cohn, supra note 3, at 306.
65 Aref, 833 F.3d at 262–63; see also Doran, supra note 4, at 1045 n.96.  This side of the
split has been called the majority in other scholarship.  Cohn, supra note 3, at 307.  How-
ever, although it was previously believed that the D.C. Circuit was on this side, that Circuit
clarified its interpretation as on the less restrictive side of the split in Aref v. Lynch, decided
in August 2016.  833 F.3d 242.  As a result, an equal number of circuits appear to fall on
each side of the split now.
66 Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Because Section 1997e(e) is
a limitation on recovery of damages for mental and emotional injury in the absence of a
showing of physical injury, it does not restrict a plaintiff’s ability to recover compensatory
damages for actual injury, nominal or punitive damages, or injunctive and declaratory
relief.”).
67 Aref, 833 F.3d at 262–63.
68 See Doran, supra note 4, at 1046.
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tion from the strict wording of the statute.”69  While this approach mimics
tort law’s prohibition on mental and emotional injuries absent physical inju-
ries,70 the circuits that oppose this approach argue that it implicitly ranks
emotional injuries as subordinate to physical injuries, while also mistakenly
merging intangible harms like constitutional violations with mental and emo-
tional injuries.71  As a result, prisoners alleging constitutional violations such
as retaliation,72 racial discrimination,73 violations of due process rights,74 vio-
lations of religious freedom,75 and violations of their equal protection
rights76 have been barred from seeking compensatory damages when they
have been unable to prove physical injury in these circuits.77  These circuits
justify allowing the prisoner to continue to seek punitive or nominal damages
because those damages are meant “to vindicate a constitutional right or to
punish for violation of that right” rather than compensating for the actual
injury.78  In this way, the courts adhere to what they consider to be the plain
69 Cohn, supra note 3, at 307 n.50 (citing United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986
(8th Cir. 2000) (“If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, that language is
conclusive absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.”)).
70 See Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is well settled that com-
pensatory damages under § 1983 are governed by general tort-law compensation theory.”).
71 See Cohn, supra note 3, at 307 n.50.
72 Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We join the majority, conclud-
ing Congress did not intend section 1997e(e) to limit recovery only to a select group of
federal actions brought by prisoners. . . . If Congress desires [a different interpretation] of
section 1997e(e), Congress can certainly say so.”).  See generally Doran, supra note 4, at 1027
(arguing that the physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e) is unconstitutional with
respect to a petition violation since it “arbitrarily impairs prisoners’ right to access the
courts and, in doing so, enables retaliation against prisoner litigants to go unchecked”).
73 Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
74 Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2002).
75 Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001); Amaker v. Goord, No.
06–CV–490A, 2015 WL 3603970, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015) (“[A]lthough the Court has
no doubt that plaintiff suffered injury as a result of defendants’ violation of his free exer-
cise rights pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, to wit, disci-
plinary confinement to special housing for approximately 200 days and repeated denial of
access to religious services and celebrations, in accordance with the precedent of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, compensation for such injury is barred . . . .”).
76 Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
77 Doran, supra note 4, at 1045–46.
78 Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2000); id. at 250 (“[Plaintiff] seeks
substantial damages for the harm he suffered as a result of defendants’ alleged violation of
his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. . . . [T]he only actual injury that
could form the basis for the award he seeks would be mental and/or emotional injury.”);
see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) (“[N]ominal
damages, and not damages based on some undefinable ‘value’ of infringed rights, are the
appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, prova-
ble injury . . . .” (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978))).
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meaning of § 1997e(e) while still maintaining some accountability for prison
officials through a threat of punitive damages.79
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits interpret
§ 1997e(e) more broadly (hereinafter the “less restrictive approach”) to
mean that constitutional harms are a form of intangible injury separate from
mental or emotional injuries and thus not excluded by the PLRA.80  As the
court in King v. Zamiara wrote: “[Section 1997e(e)] says nothing about claims
brought to redress constitutional injuries, which are distinct from mental and
emotional injuries.”81  These courts’ decisions align with the idea, expressed
in an amici curiae brief, that “[the Bill of Rights] was enacted to safeguard
the people’s liberty interests [rather than mental or emotional distress].  To
characterize a deprivation of liberty as nothing more than a ‘mental or emo-
tional injury,’ as some courts have done, is to trivialize our most basic consti-
tutional protections.”82  These courts thus hold § 1997e(e) does not
preclude prisoners from seeking compensatory damages for constitutional
violations absent physical injury.83  Rather than highlighting the language
“[n]o Federal civil action,”84 they argue that the more restrictive  interpreta-
tion of § 1997e(e) leads to the conclusion that the words “for mental or emo-
tional injury” are superfluous because if the PLRA was intended to only allow
compensatory damages for physical injuries, it would not need to include the
words “for mental or emotional injury.”85  These courts using the less restric-
tive approach tend to take the perspective that the court in Aref v. Lynch
articulated: “[W]e find it hard to believe that Congress intended to afford
virtual immunity to prison officials even when they commit blatant constitu-
79 See Cohn, supra note 3, at 315 (“[C]ourts are able to . . . us[e] the threat of a
punitive damages award to avoid giving prison authorities carte blanche to violate the con-
stitutional rights of prisoners.”).
80 Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Analogous Supreme Court
and circuit precedent supports the view that there can be real harms separate and apart
from mental or emotional injury.” (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264)); see also Doran, supra
note 4, at 1045 n.99.  In Aref, the D.C. Circuit distinguished Davis v. District of Columbia, a
case it had previously decided in which it held that a plaintiff seeking compensatory dam-
ages for an alleged privacy violation in prison could not recover because he alleged no
actual nonphysical injury, just emotional and mental distress. Aref, 833 F.3d at 266; Davis,
158 F.3d 1342.
81 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 794 (2016) (mem.).
82 Brief of Amici Curiae the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York et al. in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 4, Aref, 833 F.3d 242 (No. 15-5154).
83 Aref, 833 F.3d at 262–63.  The First and Fourth Circuits have not defined their inter-
pretations of the physical injury requirement. See Detmold, supra note 12, at 1124; see also
Smith v. James, No. 8:13-cv-1270, 2014 WL 2809609, at *7 (D.S.C. June 20, 2014) (“The
Fourth Circuit has not fully addressed the scope of § 1997e(e).”).
84 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
85 King, 788 F.3d at 213; see also Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“The deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial relief wholly
aside from any physical injury he can show, or any mental or emotional injury he may have
incurred.”).
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tional violations, as long as no physical blow is dealt.”86  Thus, both sides of
the circuit split have concluded that a prisoner’s claim must be divided up,
either by the injury or by the relief.87  Under the more restrictive approach,
if a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation without showing a physical
injury, the court will separate the claim by relief and only allow punitive or
injunctive damages.88  By contrast, if a plaintiff alleges a constitutional viola-
tion and a mental or emotional injury, the courts taking the less restrictive
approach will divide up the claim by injuries rather than damages, cutting
out the mental or emotional injury but keeping the constitutional
violation.89
Ultimately, compensatory damages are meant to compensate for actual
injury.90  Meanwhile, nominal damages are “designed to vindicate legal
rights ‘without proof of actual injury.’”91  Before the PLRA was passed, plain-
tiffs filing § 1983 claims had to show “actual” injuries to recover compensa-
tory damages.92  With the passage of the PLRA, this requirement shifted to a
physical injury requirement instead of an actual injury requirement.93  Thus,
under the more restrictive interpretation,
litigants [outside of prison] can recover for “actual damages” resulting from
[constitutional violations], not merely “nominal damages.”  Litigants must
prove those damages, but they are entitled to prove them.  Barring prisoners
from compensatory damages means that prisoners . . . are not permitted to
prove the “actual harm” that others are permitted to prove.94
III. SEXUAL ABUSE IN PRISONS AND THE 2013 AMENDMENT TO THE PLRA
Sexual abuse has been and still is a significant problem in prisons.95
The National Prison Rape Elimination Commission estimates, based on sur-
vey data, that approximately 60,500 state and federal prisoners were sexually
86 Aref, 833 F.3d at 265 (footnote omitted); see also Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936,
940 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[Requiring a showing of physical injury in every lawsuit], if taken to
its logical extreme would give prison officials free reign to maliciously and sadistically
inflict psychological torture on prisoners, so long as they take care not to inflict any physi-
cal injury in the process.”).  These issues are particularly true in cases involving violations
of prisoners’ First Amendment rights. See Aref, 833 F.3d at 265 (“It is especially difficult to
see how violations of inmates’ First Amendment rights could ever be vindicated, given the
unlikelihood of physical harm in that context.  Against that backdrop . . . we believe our
reading of Section 1997e(e) best aligns with the purposes of the PLRA.”).
87 See Aref, 833 F.3d at 263.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978).
91 Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 181 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 266).
92 Doran, supra note 4, at 1051 n.126.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1052 (emphasis added) (noting that, outside of prison, litigants can seek to
prove compensatory damages resulting from First Amendment violations—which might be
a difficult task but certainly possible—while prisoner litigants are barred from even trying).
95 See Brocco, supra note 56, at 939.
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assaulted in 2007 alone—about 4.5% of the prison population.96  Meanwhile,
adult correctional facilities reported 8763 allegations of sexual abuse from
2011, an increase from those reported in the previous year.97  Prisoners iden-
tifiable by certain characteristics tend to be at greater risk of victimization.
Some of these indicators are young age, small size, and lack of experience in
prison, as well as mental disability and mental illness.98  Likewise, individuals
who identify as nonheterosexual or transgender are also at higher risk of
assault.99  The type of abuse in prisons tends to vary depending on the type
of facility: guard-on-prisoner abuse is more common in female prisons with
male guards abusing female inmates.100  In contrast, prisoner-on-prisoner
rape is more common in male prisons.101
The aftermath of sexual abuse for a victim in prison can prove to be
catastrophic.  Individuals who are sexually abused in prison are at high risk
for trauma-related illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder and anxi-
ety.102  In fact, the experience of living as a prisoner can, on its own, exacer-
bate a victim’s trauma symptoms because he will likely not be able to leave
the vicinity of the perpetrator, meaning he will not be able to seek a safe
space to recover and he will remain at high risk of revictimization.103  Fur-
thermore, prisoner victims may experience repercussions from other inmates
or prison staff.104  To top it off, most prisons offer few mental health
resources and some put prisoner victims who report assault into administra-
96 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 17, at 40.  In 2007, there were
approximately 1.6 million state and federal prisoners.  Heather C. West & William J. Sabol,
Prisoners in 2007, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. 1 (2008).
97 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248824, PREA DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 2015
(2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca15.pdf.
98 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 17, at 7.
99 Id.
100 Katherine Robb, What We Don’t Know Might Hurt Us: Subjective Knowledge and the
Eighth Amendment’s Deliberate Indifference Standard for Sexual Abuse in Prisons, 65 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 705, 707 (2010).  Female prisoners also tend to have high rates of prior victim-
ization. See Martin A. Geer, Protection of Female Prisoners: Dissolving Standards of Decency, 2
MARGINS 175, 177 (2002) (“Female prisoners generally differ from their male counterparts
in their history of victimization by men in positions of authority outside the prisons and in
the incidences of cross-gender sexual assaults by correctional officers.”).
101 Robb, supra note 100, at 707.
102 Beth Ribet, Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of Survivor-Oriented Advo-
cacy, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 281, 287–88 (2010).
103 Id.
104 Id.  In male prisons, victims may be labeled “punks” to indicate that they are less
masculine. See also Robertson, supra note 18, at 276–77 (“Punks are commonplace in the
prison population. . . . Because many drug offenders bear [characteristics of ‘youthful Cau-
casians of small stature’ without knowledge of the prison system], their mass incarceration
has probably swelled the punk population over the last several decades” (footnote omitted)
(citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000))).  In female pris-
ons, victims are more likely to experience blame from others given that perpetrators are
often guards.  Ribet, supra note 102, at 288–89.  These individuals might also be labeled
promiscuous and their vulnerability could attract abuse by other prison staff as well. Id.
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tive segregation for their own protection, an experience that could further
victimize or exacerbate the prisoner’s trauma.105
A prisoner who has been subjected to sexual abuse may bring either a
Bivens claim106 or a § 1983107 claim against prison officials.108  A prisoner
may bring a Bivens claim if a federal officer violates his constitutional
rights.109  Meanwhile, a prisoner utilizing a § 1983 claim has a cause of action
against a state official acting under “color of law” for violating his rights
under federal law.110  Prisoner victims of sexual assault who wish to pursue
civil actions in court to recover damages typically bring claims alleging viola-
tions of their Eighth Amendment rights.111  The Eighth Amendment guaran-
tees that individuals will be free from “cruel and unusual punishment[ ]”
from the government.112  The Supreme Court held in Farmer v. Brennan that
a “prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious
harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”113 Farmer also estab-
lished the standard for determining “deliberate indifference” as a “showing
that the official was subjectively aware of the risk.”114  Additionally, in Hudson
v. McMillian, the Supreme Court held that excessive use of physical force
against a prisoner without a resulting serious injury could violate his Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.115  The Court rea-
soned that the Eighth Amendment excludes de minimis uses of physical force
as long as they are not of the kind that are “repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.”116  Subsequently, in Wilkins v. Gaddy, the Court clarified that an
105 Ribet, supra note 102, at 289 (“So, in essence, prison rape victims are immersed in a
state of extreme psychological crisis, without any likelihood of a meaningful therapeutic
outlet with which to manage or alleviate the experience.”).
106 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
108 Megan Coker, Note, Common Sense About Common Decency: Promoting a New Standard
for Guard-on-Inmate Sexual Abuse Under the Eighth Amendment, 100 VA. L. REV. 437, 440–41
(2014).
109 See Brocco, supra note 56, at 930; Coker, supra note 108, at 440–41.
110 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Brocco, supra note 56, at 930; Coker, supra note 108, at 440–41.
Prisoners make up a significant proportion of individuals bringing § 1983 claims, likely
because they spend their lives in constant contact with state officials while incarcerated. See
Miller, supra note 22, at 929–30.
111 See Brocco, supra note 56, at 920.
112 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
113 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
114 Id. at 829 (stating that“[s]ubjective[ ] aware[ness]” requires actual knowledge of the
risk).
115 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
116 Id. at 9–10 (“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.  This is true whether or not
significant injury is evident.  Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quan-
tity of injury.  Such a result would have been unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth
Amendment as it is today.” (internal citations omitted)).
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excessive force claim should be decided based on “the nature of the force
rather than the extent of the injury.”117  Thus, prisoners who are victims of
sexual assault in prison can bring claims for violations of their Eighth
Amendment rights under certain circumstances using either a Bivens or a
§ 1983 claim depending on whom they are suing.
Before the 2013 Amendment to the PLRA, federal courts ruling on pris-
oners’ § 1983 claims against state prison officials alleging sexual abuse with-
out a showing of physical injury interpreted § 1997e(e) inconsistently.  The
majority of courts found that sexual assault constituted a physical injury
under § 1997e(e).118  For example, the court in Liner v. Goord held that
“alleged sexual assaults qualify as physical injuries as a matter of common
sense.”119  However, other courts held that a prisoner alleging sexual assault
without a showing of physical injury could not bring a claim under the
PLRA.120  Thus, the question that courts faced before the 2013 Amendment
was passed was whether sexual assault itself was an emotional injury, an intan-
gible injury, or a physical injury.121  The National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission expressed the frustration many felt about different interpreta-
tions of sexual assault when it wrote that when courts held that sexual assault
without a showing of physical injury did not constitute a physical injury, those
courts “fail[ed] to take into account the very real emotional and psychologi-
cal injuries that often follow sexual assault, ranging from temporary fear and
emotional numbness to nightmares and major depressive episodes that can
occur months or years after an assault.”122  The Commission further noted
that it was “convinced that victims of sexual abuse are losing vital avenues for
relief because they cannot prove physical injury as defined in the PLRA.  Vic-
tims deserve their day in court.”123
This response to sexual assault’s treatment by the PLRA parallels the
reactions of the courts using the less restrictive approach to interpreting
§ 1997e(e).  In fact, the courts’ differing interpretations of how § 1997e(e)
treated sexual assault before the 2013 Amendment generally aligned with the
interpretations on each side of the circuit split regarding constitutional viola-
tions absent a physical injury.  The courts that interpreted sexual assault as
essentially a physical injury before the 2013 Amendment were also those that
117 559 U.S. 34, 34 (2010).
118 See generally John Boston, Congress Amends PLRA Physical Injury Requirement for Sexual
Abuse Cases, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/
2013/jul/15/congress-amends-plra-physical-injury-requirement-for-sexual-abuse-cases/.
119 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
120 Hancock v. Payne, No. Civ.A.103CV671, 2006 WL 21751, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4,
2006) (“[T]he plaintiffs do not make any claim of physical injury beyond the bare allega-
tion of sexual assault. . . . They make no claim of physical injury . . . . Therefore, the Court
finds no claim or evidence of a physical injury and that [plaintiffs] have failed to meet the
physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, § 1997e(e).”).
121 See Deborah M. Golden, The Prison Litigation Reform Act—A Proposal for Closing the
Loophole for Rapists, J. ACS ISSUE GRPS. 95, 95 (2006).
122 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 17, at 95.
123 Id.
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used the less restrictive interpretation (the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits).124  In the broader split on constitutional violations, these courts
view sexual assault as something other than a mental or emotional injury—an
intangible injury—even if it does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amend-
ment violation.  In Carrington v. Easley, the court agreed with the magistrate
judge’s previous ruling that, “even absent a physical injury, sexual assault is
an injury of ‘constitutional dimensions’ as to which the PLRA does not bar
recovery.”125  This reasoning suggests that these courts see sexual assault,
even when it does not reach the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, as a
form of harm comparable to constitutional violations.  In contrast, the courts
that held that sexual assault without a physical injury did not fit within
§ 1997e(e) looked only at the strict meaning of the words in the provision,
rather than the implication of that interpretation on different types of
harms.126
In 2013, Congress amended § 1997e(e) through the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act (hereinafter “2013 VAWA Reauthorization”),
adding “or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title
18, United States Code).”127  While one scholar marked the change as a “sig-
nificant amendment” to the PLRA, it was not a source of much debate in
Congress.128  Rather, it appears to have stemmed from the enactment of the
Prison Rape Elimination Act129 and a subsequent report by the Prison Rape
124 See supra text accompanying notes 80–89.
125 Carrington v. Easley, No. 5:08-CT-3175, 2011 WL 2132850, at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 25,
2011) (quoting the magistrate judge’s opinion in the case).  The court in this case did not
award the plaintiff, who had been sexually assaulted by his prison guard, compensatory
damages because it found that he had not provided sufficient evidence of actual damages.
While the plaintiff testified about his mental and emotional distress, including nightmares,
anxiety, panic attacks, and bed-wetting, the court required evidence of professional treat-
ment in order to provide compensatory damages. Id. at *4.  However, the court’s holding
was that the plaintiff was not barred from recovery by the PLRA. Id. at *3–4; see also Cleve-
land v. Curry, 07-cv-02809, 2014 WL 690846, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (“[A]ny type of
sexual assault is ‘always’ deeply offensive to human dignity.”).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 64–79; see also Hancock v. Payne, No.
Civ.A.103CV671, 2006 WL 21751, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2006).
127 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 1101(a), 127
Stat. 134.
128 Boston, supra note 118.
129 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 and 45 U.S.C.); see Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L
PREA RES. CTR., https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/about/prison-rape-elimination-act-
prea (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (“In addition to creating a mandate for significant research
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and through the National Institute of Justice, funding
through the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Corrections sup-
ported major efforts in many state correctional, juvenile detention, community correc-
tions, and jail systems.  The act also created the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission and charged it with developing draft standards for the elimination of prison
rape.  Those standards were published in June 2009, and were turned over to the Depart-
ment of Justice for review and passage as a final rule.  That final rule became effective
August 20, 2012.”).
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Elimination Act Commission.130  The Commission’s 2009 Report criticized
the “serious hurdles that . . . block access to the courts for many victims of
sexual abuse,”131 particularly singling out the PLRA’s exhaustion of the
administrative remedies requirement and the physical injury requirement of
§ 1997e(e).132  Other advocacy groups also contributed to the condemnation
of § 1997e(e) although the criticism seemed to advocate more for removing
the provision than amending it.133  In fact, in 2007 and again in 2009, Repre-
sentative Robert Scott introduced a bill called the “Prison Abuse Remedies
Act of 2009” in the House of Representatives that, inter alia, proposed to
eliminate § 1997e(e) altogether.134  However, the bill never advanced in
Congress.135  Similarly, the eventual 2013 Amendment was previously
included in the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, which
Congress ultimately did not pass that year.136
The amendment to the PLRA that eventually passed through the 2013
VAWA Reauthorization is an addition to the back end of § 1997e(e).137  It
consists of two parts: “or the commission of a sexual act,” followed by the
parenthetical defining “sexual act” according to 18 U.S.C. § 2246.138  This
section of the United States Code defines “sexual act” as:
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus,
and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs
upon penetration, however slight;
130 Ribet, supra note 102, at 297 (“[A]t the urging of the National Prison Rape Elimina-
tion Commission, a body established under PREA, as well as that of human rights advo-
cates, it appears that efforts to amend the PLRA in order to remove some barriers to sexual
assault related litigation may be successful in the near future.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Giovanna Shay, PREA’s Peril, 7 NE. U. L.J. 21, 35–36 (2015) (noting that although the
PLRA amendment was not expressly part of PREA regulations, it was likely a result of
broader advocacy efforts by groups such as Just Detention International).
131 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 17, at 93.
132 Id.  Notably, in the 2013 VAWA Reauthorization Act, the changes to the PLRA are
placed right before an amendment to the Prison Rape Elimination Act. See Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 1101(a)–(c).
133 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 280; see also Wendy N. Davis, Unlocking the Lawsuit,
NAT’L PULSE (June 1, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/unlocking_
the_lawsuit (describing some of the efforts to remove § 1997e(e) and the exhaustion of
administrative remedies provision of the PLRA).
134 H.R. 4335, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); see also Editorial, Combating Prisoner Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/opinion/21mon3.html
(criticizing § 1997e(e) and describing Representative Scott’s bill).
135 H.R. 4335—Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2009, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress
.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4335 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
136 S.1925, 112th Cong. § 1002(a) (2012).
137 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 1101(a).  So far, courts
have interpreted the amendment not to apply retroactively. See Doe v. United States, No.
12-00640, 2014 WL 7272853, at *6–7 (D. Haw. Dec. 17, 2014).
138 18 U.S.C. § 2246 (2012); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013
§ 1101(a).  The Act also inserted the amendment into 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) (2012),
another section of the PLRA.
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(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the
vulva, or the mouth and the anus;
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of
another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humili-
ate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia
of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person.139
This definition certainly covers sexual acts involving any amount of penetra-
tion.140  Additionally, it includes a broader definition of sexual acts not
involving penetration with respect to minor victims.141  It also includes oral
sexual contact.142  Since this definition provides such a detailed description
of specific sexual acts, it could be viewed as creating greater protection for
victims who experience crimes that fall within its explicit parameters.  How-
ever, it also generates a risk that other types of sexual abuse will be left out if
they do not fit within its unequivocal boundaries.
IV. THE 2013 AMENDMENT TO THE PLRA CHANGES ITS MEANING AND
AFFECTS HOW EACH SIDE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT SHOULD
INTERPRET IT WITH RESPECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS ABSENT PHYSICAL INJURIES
The 2013 Amendment to § 1997e(e) allows prisoners who have been
sexually assaulted in accordance with the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2246 to
seek justice, but it also changes the plain meaning of § 1997e(e), affecting
the interpretations on both sides of the broader circuit split.  The 2013
Amendment seems to reveal that Congress intends for the provision to bar
prisoners claiming constitutional violations absent a physical injury from
seeking compensatory damages.  However, if the amended § 1997e(e) is read
to bar constitutional violations absent a physical injury, it will result in unfair
application for different defendants.  Ultimately, this more restrictive inter-
pretation of § 1997e(e) fails to further the policy goals of both the Prison
Litigation Reform Act and the Prison Rape Elimination Act.
The 2013 Amendment changes the plain meaning of § 1997e(e) and, as
a result, affects how courts should interpret its meaning on both sides of the
circuit split.  Section 1997e(e) now reads in full:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
139 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2).  Section 2246 also includes definitions for “prison,” “sexual
contact,” “serious bodily injury,” and “State.” Id. § 2246.
140 See id. § 2246(2)(A); id. § 2246(2)(C).
141 Id. § 2246(2)(D).
142 Id. § 2246(2)(B).
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while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commis-
sion of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).143
Since 2013, courts generally have incorporated the amendment into the
plain meaning of § 1997e(e) by interpreting “commission of a sexual act” as
independent from, and not affecting, how they interpret the rest of the provi-
sion.144  Thus, if a plaintiff alleges a sexual act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246,
absent a physical injury, he may now recover compensatory damages.  How-
ever, courts have not wavered from their previous interpretations of the pro-
vision with respect to constitutional violations absent physical injuries.  In
Woods v. United States,145 a prisoner alleged that a prison official violated his
Eighth Amendment rights when he conducted a pat down of the plaintiff
that included inappropriate touching of a sexual nature without the pris-
oner’s consent.146  The court held that under the amended § 1997e(e), the
plaintiff could not recover compensatory damages because the sexual act did
not meet the standard set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2246 as required by the 2013
Amendment.147  As this case was decided in the Eleventh Circuit, which uses
the more restrictive approach, the court held that this plaintiff could not
recover under the plain language of the provision or through a constitu-
tional violation because the plaintiff had not alleged a greater than de minimis
physical injury.148
The courts using the less restrictive approach still treat sexual assault as a
constitutional violation regardless of whether it fits within the definition pro-
vided by 18 U.S.C. § 2246.  In Cleveland v. Curry,149 the prisoner plaintiffs
alleged that a prison guard had “squeezed their penises and/or their
scrotums for several seconds while performing clothed-body searches.”150
They subsequently alleged violations of their Eighth Amendment rights and
sought damages for physical, mental, and/or emotional injuries.151
Although the plaintiffs had not shown evidence of sexual acts that fell within
the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2246, the Ninth Circuit looked to precedent
from before the amendment, which aligned with the less restrictive
approach, and held that “any type of sexual assault is ‘always’ deeply offensive
to human dignity. . . . [P]laintiffs seeking compensatory damages for the vio-
lation of certain constitutional rights are not subject to the PLRA’s physical
injury requirement.”152  Thus, under the less restrictive approach, the court
refused to eliminate a sexual assault claim that fell below the definition’s
143 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2013).
144 See, e.g., Woods v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00713, 2015 WL 9947694 (N.D. Ala.
Dec. 11, 2015).
145 Id.
146 Id. at *2.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 No. 07-cv-02809, 2014 WL 690846 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014).
150 Id. at *1.
151 Id.
152 Id. at *7.
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threshold for sexual acts in the 2013 Amendment and instead allowed a
broader interpretation of the provision.
While courts have avoided interpreting the 2013 Amendment as any-
thing more than an addition to § 1997e(e) that should be treated as indepen-
dent and should not affect the rest of the provision, the 2013 Amendment
should change the way courts interpret § 1997e(e).  The 2013 Amendment
certainly affects the less restrictive interpretation of the language of
§ 1997e(e).  As the court noted in King v. Zamiara, “[e]very word in the stat-
ute is presumed to have meaning, and we must give effect to all the words to
avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous or redun-
dant.”153  In fact, the less restrictive approach relies on an interpretative
approach that deems no words superfluous.154  These courts have previously
viewed the inclusion of “mental and emotional” in the statutory language to
mean that the provision just excluded mental and emotional injuries and
therefore did not intend to eliminate intangible injuries like constitutional
violations absent physical injury.155  These circuits must now incorporate the
addition of “commission of a sexual act” into their interpretation of the pro-
vision, given the notion that every word must be presumed to have a
meaning.
Additionally, since these courts using the less restrictive approach previ-
ously viewed sexual assault as a form of a constitutional violation,156 they
should now reexamine whether their chosen interpretation holds.  If, as the
court held in Cleveland,157 sexual assault is to be considered an intangible
harm comparable to a constitutional violation, and every word of the statute
is to be interpreted with the presumption of having meaning, then the entire
2013 Amendment would be rendered superfluous.  As the court wrote in
Morton v. Johnson, where an inmate was rubbed “down to [her] private
area”158 by a prison guard, “[t]he Court need not decide [the question of
whether the defendant’s actions constituted the ‘commission of a sexual act’]
if sexual battery itself shows ‘physical injury.’”159  If courts are still finding
that “sexual contact itself constitutes ‘physical injury’ without describing in
detail the guard’s alleged conduct,”160 then these courts are essentially nulli-
fying the 2013 Amendment.  Alternatively, if these courts see sexual assault as
fundamentally different from constitutional violations and thus choose to
continue with their previous interpretation regarding constitutional viola-




156 Carrington v. Easley, No. 5:08-CT-3175, 2011 WL 2132850, at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 25,
2011).
157 Cleveland, 2014 WL 690846, at *7.
158 No. 7:13cv00496, 2015 WL 4470104, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 21, 2015) (alteration in
original).
159 Id.
160 Id. (first citing Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999); and then citing
Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 2009)).
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tions as intangible harms, they must grapple with the problem that Congress
chose not to add constitutional violations to § 1997e(e) when it had the
opportunity through the 2013 Amendment.
The 2013 Amendment also affects the more restrictive approach because
it changes the basic premise upon which those circuits justify their approach.
Whereas the circuits using the more restrictive approach focused on the lan-
guage “[n]o Federal civil action” and “without a prior showing of physical
injury,” concluding that this applied to all cases regardless of what type of act
had occurred,161 now they must also grapple with “commission of a sexual
act.”  This will refocus the inquiry from exclusively examining the plaintiff’s
injury to asking about injuries or particular sexual acts.162  The practical out-
come of the 2013 Amendment on the more restrictive approach is that these
circuits will be forced to allow claims involving sexual acts absent a physical
injury as somehow superior to constitutional violations, while still rejecting
claims that constitute constitutional violations (because of the absence of a
physical injury).  Additionally, prisoners will be able to recover compensatory
damages under the more restrictive approach for sexual acts directly commit-
ted against them by prison guards that do not result in physical injuries.  Yet,
prisoners will not be able to recover for Eighth Amendment violations absent
physical injury when a prison guard has shown deliberate indifference or
even subjective awareness of the risk of sexual assault against that prisoner.163
In fact, the impact of the 2013 Amendment on the meaning of
§ 1997e(e) may turn on whether sexual acts as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2246
automatically constitute violations of the Eighth Amendment.  If they do,
then the circuits using the more restrictive approach may argue that the 2013
Amendment would be superfluous if prisoners alleging constitutional viola-
tions absent physical injury can already seek compensatory damages for con-
stitutional violations.  By contrast, if sexual acts under 28 U.S.C. § 2246 do
not constitute Eight Amendment violations, then the circuits using the less
restrictive approach could argue that the 2013 Amendment does not address
constitutional violations absent a physical injury, thereby making the amend-
ment additive and not duplicative or superfluous.  However, the courts using
161 See supra notes 64–79.
162 See Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The underlying
substantive violation . . . should not be divorced from the resulting injury, such as ‘mental
or emotional injury,’ thus avoiding the clear mandate of § 1997e(e).  The statute limits the
remedies available, regardless of the rights asserted, if the only injuries are mental or
emotional.”).
163 See supra notes 106–17; see also Cleveland v. Curry, No. 07-cv-02809, 2014 WL
690846, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (“[O]nly certain types of sexually [sic] assault will
cause objective and observable physical injuries, but any type of sexual assault is ‘always’
deeply offensive to human dignity.  As a matter of policy and of common sense, it would be
illogical to allow guards who . . . assault prisoners without leaving observable physical inju-
ries to escape liability under the PLRA because they have only caused psychological, emo-
tional, dignitary and other injuries.  Similarly, it would be illogical to allow guards to
sexually assault large numbers of prisoners . . . but escape liability because they only
assaulted each prisoner a ‘small’ amount.” (footnote omitted)).
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the less restrictive approach have actually been interpreting sexual assault
absent a physical injury as the opposite—as Eighth Amendment violations—
rendering cases like Cleveland problematic if they are supposed to treat the
2013 Amendment as something more than superfluous.
As a result, since the 2013 Amendment causes so many discrepancies for
the courts using the less restrictive approach, it reveals that Congress
intended for the more restrictive interpretation of § 1997e(e) to prevail.
While the 2013 Amendment affects both interpretations in the split, it results
in rendering the less restrictive interpretation’s reasoning problematic and
circular.  Because sexual assault absent a physical injury would normally be
categorized as an intangible harm, it would not make sense for these courts
to still read intangible harms to be unaddressed by § 1997e(e) given that it
now addresses one form of intangible harm.  If Congress put in one type of
intangible harm, then it must have purposefully chosen not to include other
types of intangible harms.  Under the more restrictive approach, courts must
now consider that the practical consequences of the amendment are such
that sexual acts falling below the bar of Eighth Amendment violations must
be categorically allowed while still excluding other constitutional violations
absent a physical injury.  While this outcome may seem problematic, this
reading of the provision still fits with the addition of the 2013 Amendment
because it does not require any more reading between the lines by the
courts—rather, it shows that Congress intends for prisoners to recover com-
pensatory damages only for physical injuries and now also for sexual acts fall-
ing within the definition provided.  Thus, the 2013 Amendment should be
understood to show that Congress views the more restrictive approach as the
appropriate way of applying § 1997e(e).
V. SOLUTION: NEEDED CLARIFICATIONS TO 42 U.S.C. § 1997E(E)
The circuit split between the methods of interpreting § 1997e(e) must
be resolved, either by the Supreme Court or through a change made by Con-
gress.  If the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari on a case regarding the
meaning of § 1997e(e),164 it would likely look at the plain meaning of the
provision first and then give some weight to Congress’s intent with respect to
§ 1997e(e) and the PLRA overall, particularly if it found the language of the
provision to be ambiguous.165  If the Supreme Court were to hold that the
164 The Supreme Court most recently denied certiorari in King v. Zamiara.  788 F.3d
207 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 794 (2016) (mem.).  The holding by the Sixth
Circuit, using the less restrictive approach, controlled as a result. Id. at 213 (“Therefore,
the plain language of the statute does not bar claims for constitutional injury that do not
also involve physical injury.”).  However, since Aref v. Lynch, decided in August 2016,
reversed what was previously understood to be the D.C. Circuit’s approach to the circuit
split and subsequently evened the number of circuits on each side of the split, the
Supreme Court might be more amenable to granting certiorari in a future case on this
subject. See 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
165 While the circuit split itself seems to evidence the fact that § 1997e(e) is ambiguous
on its face, the circuits using the more restrictive approach have held that the plain mean-
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plain meaning of the provision was unambiguous and the more restrictive
interpretation to be authoritative (a result more likely after the 2013 Amend-
ment),166 the PLRA would be even less likely to further its intended goals or
those of the PREA.
While the 2013 Amendment might reveal that Congress intended for the
more restrictive interpretation to prevail, that interpretation of § 1997e(e)
fails to adhere to the goals of the Prison Litigation Reform Act or the Prison
Rape Elimination Act because it narrows the definition of sexual assault in a
way that prevents valid sexual abuse claims from reaching the courts.  While
the specificity of the definition of “sexual acts” in 18 U.S.C. § 2246 suggests
that some particular types of sexual assault will be undeniably covered under
§ 1997e(e) in the future, so that prisoners who are unable to show a physical
injury will be able to recover compensable damages, prisoners experiencing
harms that do not fall within the § 2246 definition might be left out.167  For
example, this definition notably disregards sexual touching that does not
involve penetration (except for unclothed touching of individuals younger
than sixteen), as well as touching of women’s breasts.168  As the court empha-
sized in Cleveland v. Curry, excluding from the definition of sexual assault less
extreme forms of abuse makes no sense in the context of a prison:
[U]nlike in other situations where guards are accused of using “excessive”
force, there can be no justification for sexually abusive conduct in a prison
setting in any context; there is no level of sexual force that is “acceptable”
due to exigent circumstances or the realities of prison life.  No use of sexual
force is required to maintain discipline.  No prisoner can resist an order or
behave in a manner that justifies, much less requires, sexual abuse by a
guard.169
ing of the provision is unambiguous. See supra Part II.  If the Supreme Court were to find
the language of § 1997e(e) to be clear, it could determine that the legislative intent
behind the PLRA and the PREA are of little relevance to their inquiry. See Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012) (holding that consideration of legislative
history was unnecessary because the statute at issue was unambiguous); cf. Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1981) (“‘[T]he starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself.’  But ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of
a single statute need not end the inquiry.  This is because the plain-meaning rule is ‘rather
an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persua-
sive evidence if it exists.’  The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may
persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their
literal effect.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); and then quoting
Bos. Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)) (first citing Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424 (1981); then citing Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 10
(1976); and then citing United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44
(1940))).
166 See supra Part IV.
167 See Boston, supra note 118.
168 Id.
169 Cleveland v. Curry, 07-cv-02809, 2014 WL 690846, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014)
(footnote omitted).
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Thus, if courts read the 2013 Amendment as covering all sexual acts absent a
physical injury, then sexual acts that do not fall under the definition in 18
U.S.C. § 2246 will remain unpunished despite the fact that they can never
satisfy a legitimate penal purpose and can still cause significant psychological
and emotional injuries for prisoner victims.170
As a result, some cases that have previously been decided on the under-
standing that sexual assault falls under a person’s Eighth Amendment rights
as a matter of “common sense”171 would be decided differently under the
2013 Amendment.172  For example, the court would decide Duncan v. Mage-
lessen173 differently.  In that case, a prisoner alleged that a guard sexually
molested him by “playing with his penis” during pat-down searches multiple
times over a period of months and the court held that he was entitled to seek
compensatory damages because “sexual contact, alone, is a physical injury”
even without a showing of an actual physical injury174 after the 2013 Amend-
ment.  This prisoner would not be able to seek compensatory damages under
the less restrictive approach because the alleged sexual abuse did not include
penetration and the prisoner was older than sixteen years old.  Likewise, the
holding in Marrie v. Nickels175 would be reversed under the more restrictive
approach.  In that case, the prisoner alleged that a guard sexually abused
him during a frisk search when he put his hands down the prisoner’s pants
and “caressed his buttocks, and stroked his genitalia.”176  The touching
occurred under the prisoner’s clothing but he was an adult and no penetra-
tion occurred.177  As a result, it would not be covered under the definition in
the 2013 Amendment.  Thus, while the 2013 Amendment helps prisoners
seek justice when the sexual abuse they have experienced falls within the
definition provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2246, it leaves out some acts that courts
have previously considered to constitute sexual assault such that those victims
are decidedly cut out from seeking compensatory damages by § 1997e(e).
And, ultimately, since § 1997e(e) excludes nonfrivolous sexual assault claims
that do not involve penetration, it fails to further the Prison Rape Elimina-
tion Act’s purported goal of reducing sexual abuse in prisons.178
170 See supra notes 95–105, 162.
171 Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
172 See Boston, supra note 118; see also Coker, supra note 108, at 442 (noting that before
the amendment was enacted, “courts rested their interpretations of the PLRA on its ambi-
guity, declaring that Congress could not have meant to exclude all actions alleging only
emotional injury for sexual abuse, or even all types of damages for those injuries.  With this
new clarification, courts may further limit inmates’ causes of action” (footnote omitted)).
173 No. 07-cv-01979, 2008 WL 2783487 (D. Colo. July 15, 2008).
174 Id. at *1, *4.
175 70 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1264 (D. Kan. 1999) (“[S]exual assaults would qualify as physi-
cal injuries under § 1997e(e).”).
176 Id. at 1257.
177 Id.
178 See supra notes 122–23, 130–32 and accompanying text.
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The 2013 Amendment also does not further the main goal of the PLRA,
which is to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.179
While the 2013 Amendment certifies that certain sexual assault lawsuits will
not be dismissed for failure to show a physical injury, and seems to point to
the more restrictive approach as the method Congress intended for
§ 1997e(e), the amendment does little to definitively clarify the scope of
§ 1997e(e).  Furthermore, data on prisoner lawsuits has shown that the PLRA
as a whole has not furthered the goals it was intended to accomplish.180
While the number of lawsuits filed by prisoners decreased by sixty percent
between 1995 (when the Act was passed) and 2006,181 the rate of claims that
were dismissed as frivolous did not change in a significant way,182 suggesting
that the PLRA is not effective at filtering out frivolous lawsuits while retaining
access to courts for meritorious lawsuits.  On a broader scale, the PLRA has
also essentially ended the use of litigation as a tool to spur prison reform183
due to the barriers it sets for prisoners to get to court and the incentives it
creates for lawyers not to accept cases.184
Not only does the 2013 Amendment throw a wrench into the interpreta-
tive methods on both sides of the circuit split, it may also create incentives for
prisoners to file untruthful claims, a problem closely tethered to the issue of
frivolous lawsuits.  Because so many courts read § 1997e(e) using the more
restrictive approach, one consequence of the 2013 Amendment could be that
it incentivizes prisoners to adjust their allegations so that they hinge on an
alleged sexual assault even if it was a minor aspect of the incident or did not
happen, in order that they receive some form of remedy beyond nominal or
punitive damages.185  On the flipside, the 2013 Amendment could also moti-
vate prison guards to deny that sexual abuse has occurred in order to main-
tain the previously high barriers set by the PLRA.186  As a result, the 2013
Amendment to § 1997e(e) might, in fact, create some problematic incentives
for prisoners and guards alike.
Additionally, the 2013 Amendment prioritizes sexual assault above other
types of harms such that victims of sexual assault may gain easier and more
effective access to courts than others who experience troublesome rights vio-
lations.  As Giovanna Shay writes, legislation that focuses on reduction of
rape in prisons “may create a kind of exceptionalism for incarcerated peo-
ple’s claims of sexual abuse, sometimes producing unintended conse-
quences. . . . Other serious forms of abuse remain subject to the PLRA.”187
Thus, although it was very important for Congress to clarify that sexual abuse
179 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
180 See Schlanger, supra note 6, at 162.
181 See Doran, supra note 4, at 1041.
182 Schlanger, supra note 6, at 162.
183 See supra Section I.A.
184 See Ribet, supra note 102, at 296.
185 See Shay, supra note 130, at 32–33.
186 Schlanger & Shay, supra note 32, at 145–46.
187 Shay, supra note 130, at 32.
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without a showing of physical injury should not be dismissed under the PLRA,
the 2013 Amendment overlooked many fundamental constitutional viola-
tions in addition to forms of sexual abuse falling below the bar set by 18
U.S.C. § 2246 absent physical injuries.  Ultimately, the effect of the circuit
split and the 2013 Amendment has been that prisoners in different jurisdic-
tions have unequal access to the courts.  As a result, some prisoners may
recover for violations for which others may not.
Congress should amend or remove § 1997e(e) so that the physical injury
and sexual assault concepts under 18 U.S.C. § 2246 do not create such high
barriers for prisoners seeking access to courts.  While removing § 1997e(e)
could potentially give rise to an increase in the number of frivolous lawsuits
filed by prisoners, it currently does not successfully distinguish frivolous law-
suits from meritorious ones.188  Thus, if the provision is to remain in the
PLRA, Congress should revise it so that it better identifies which types of
injury or which types of violations should merit compensatory damages.
Since focusing solely on prisoners’ injuries rather than the violation of their
rights has given rise to so many problems with interpretation and sometimes
bars prisoners from seeking compensatory damages for serious constitutional
violations absent physical injury and sexual acts falling below the definition
in the statute, Congress should amend § 1997e(e) so that it narrows prison-
ers’ claims based on the violations they have experienced.  If the goal is to
limit frivolous lawsuits while increasing access for meritorious claims, then
Congress should tailor the statute to more effectively weed out acceptable
from problematic types of conduct rather than dividing physical from non-
physical injuries.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, section 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act has cre-
ated confusion and inconsistency across the federal circuits regarding how to
interpret its ambiguous and imprecise language.  The resulting circuit split
has created a schism in how courts view constitutional violations in compari-
son to mental and emotional injuries, meaning prisoners in some jurisdic-
tions may recover compensatory damages for violations for which prisoners
in other jurisdictions cannot.  Congress opted not to take the opportunity to
fix that discrepancy through the 2013 VAWA Reauthorization, instead adding
a few choice words to the end of the provision.  While the 2013 Amendment
surely was intended to help prevent sexual abuse in prisons and fill a needed
gap in how prisoners are treated in the court system, it failed to provide a
wide enough definition for sexual acts and thus excluded many prisoners
who have experienced different forms of sexual abuse from recovering com-
pensatory damages.  Furthermore, it could incentivize prisoners and prison
guards to file untruthful claims simply in order to access the courts.  Ulti-
mately, the 2013 Amendment provides little help in clarifying whether pris-
oners may recover compensatory damages for constitutional violations absent
188 See supra text accompanying notes 179–84.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 27 15-JUN-17 12:08
2017] compensatory  damages  are  not  for  everyone 2229
physical injury or sexual assault falling below the threshold determined by 18
U.S.C. § 2246.  While the 2013 Amendment points towards the more restric-
tive approach taken by half of circuit courts as Congress’s intended meaning,
this interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) fails to further the stated goals of
the PLRA or the PREA.
Historically, litigation has proven to be an effective tool for prisoners to
utilize when seeking prison reform.  The PLRA has removed this option and
essentially left prisoners without a voice to share violations of their rights with
the world outside of their confinement.  Even when prisoners can overcome
the other limitations set forth in the PLRA, they still must contend with the
inconsistent application and sometimes prohibitively restrictive use of
§ 1997e(e) by courts against them.  The Supreme Court or Congress must
clarify the meaning of § 1997e(e) in order to resolve the discrepancies and
confusion surrounding the meaning of this provision with respect to constitu-
tional violations absent a physical injury and sexual assault that falls below the
threshold set out by 18 U.S.C. § 2246.
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